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Federations thrived where levels of government exist and function based on shared rule and self-rule 
concurrently. Thus, a key defining feature of federalism is the assignment of responsibilities between 
component units such that each unit is assigned specific responsibilities within its jurisdiction. 
However, in Nigeria, the disproportionate distribution of responsibilities and resources amongst the 
component units had resulted in a dysfunctional federation. By virtue of the provision of section 7 of 
1999 Constitution, Supreme Court's judgements and extra-judicial pronouncements, local governments 
are under the "supervisory control" of the State Governments (SGs). However, the extent to which this 
supervisory control is exercised has been at the front burner of every discourse on Nigerian politics and 
particular governance challenges. While examining state-local governments relations from both legal 
and operational viewpoints, this paper illustrates how the SGs wore away the intent of the framers of 
the Constitution, which is to institute a system of local government that is properly organised, 
monitored supervised by the SGs. A qualitative research approach was used. Data was collected via 
official documents, relevant literature, and interviews from officials of the SGs and local governments 
and experts selected purposively and conveniently. The paper established that local governments are 
failing simply because the SGs have failed to perform their responsibilities per the spirit of the 
Constitution and other extant laws. The article finally advocates for an efficient and effective local 
government system premise on the federal decentralise system. In doing that, it is important to stress 
that the existing legal aspect does require slight adjustment especially granting the Houses of Assembly 
of State and state judiciary reasonable autonomy to checkmate the excesses of the SGs. Moreover, 
accomplishing this will significantly restructure and improve the operational aspect of the relationship 
for a virile local government system. 
 







Generally, local government system is classified implicitly on the relation of local to national 
government within a country (Wolman, 2008). Thus, in the case of Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution 
clearly specified the relationship between the local governments (LGs) of a State and other tier of 
government. Basically, it is made noticeably clear that LGs are under the control of the SGs in 
virtually every ramification. Section 7 (1-6) provides for a system of local government by 
democratically elected Local Government Councils, and accordingly, the Government of every State 
shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for their establishment, structure, composition, 
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finance, and functions. Further to this, the LGs are mandated to participate in the economic planning 
and development in the State. Thus, they shall participate in the Government of the State as respects to 
the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education, the development of 
agriculture and natural resources, provision and maintenance of health services, and such other 
functions as may be conferred by the House of Assembly (CFRN, 1999). Thus, to a significant degree, 
responsibilities of SGs and LGs are overlapping towards providing services and to virtually single 
group of beneficiaries. Therefore, these provisions alluded to the fact that LGs are an annexure to the 
SGs. They are under the strict supervision of the SGs in terms of fiscal management, it is the business 
of the SGs to organize, supervise and to monitor their finances, and to an extent staffing. Accordingly, 
Uwais (2005) affirmed that a close examination of the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, 
shows that the supervision of LGs is the responsibility of the SGs. 
 
In the same way, section 162 (6) of the 1999 Constitution provides that each State shall maintain a 
special account to be called ‘State Joint Local Government Account’ (SJLGA) into which shall be paid 
all allocations to the LGs of the State from the FA and from the Government of the State. Although, 
there have been controversies as to whether the SGs are trustees of the SJLGA or channels for 
transmitting the funds to their respective local governments. However, just as Olowu (1986) opined 
local governments are in worse position of dependency, but this is more pronounced and pathetic since 
the return to civil rule in 1999 (because the 1999 Constitution share similar provisions with the 1979 
Constitution). Local government system since the return to civil rule in 1999 had become a subject of 
national debate among scholars and practitioners. Hence, several studies by World Bank (2002), 
Akindele, Olaopa, and Obiyan (2002), Asaju (2010), Daniel (2012), Wilson (2013), and Abdulhamid 
and Chima (2015) observed the dwindling performance of local governments in Nigeria as democratic 
institutions and grassroots institutions for service delivery. Perhaps, this explains why the National 
Assembly in all the efforts to amend the 1999 Constitution, focused (although unsuccessful) on 
granting local government autonomy.  
 
In view of these, the purpose of this paper is to examine state-local governments relations in Nigeria 
from both the legal and operational viewpoints, and to set our understanding of the ongoing clamour 
for restructuring and granting local governments autonomy. Hence, following this introduction, is an 
overview of the history of local government system in Nigeria. Next it discusses the functional 
responsibilities of LGs and fiscal intergovernmental relations between SGs and LGs, which is 
followed by discourse on complexities of local government control. Lastly, in the concluding section it 
offers recommendations for restructuring state-local relations towards promoting cooperation and 




Understanding Local Governments in Nigeria: An Overview 
 
Local governments (LGs) are governments at local levels through representative councils established 
by law that exercise specific functions within defined areas so as to complement the activities of 
superior levels of government. Boadway and Shah (2009), defined LGs as specific institutions or 
entities created by national constitutions (Brazil, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden), by 
state constitutions (Australia, the United States), by ordinary legislation of a higher central government 
(New Zealand), the United Kingdom, most countries), by provincial or state legislation (Canada and 
Pakistan) or by executive (China) to deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small 
geographically delineated area. Thus, LGs in Nigeria evolve in the mould of Native Authorities (NA), 
that administer areas possibly homogenous in respect of the ethnic and linguistic features of their 
population. The Native Authority normally consists of a chief (usually an Emir, Oba, or Chief) 
associated with a council which may consist of members ex-officio and nominated and may include 
elected members. The Native Authority vary greatly in area, population, and administrative systems. 
Hence, the Native Authority Law was designed broadly to allow for the variations of their 
organizations, procedure, and functions. 
 





Yahaya (1980), opined that the Native Authority as the unit of local government was supported by a 
bureaucratic organization known as the Native Administration. Then, the functions of the Native 
Authority were solely the maintenance of law and order and collection of taxes. Further to these, the 
Authority provides social services such as education, electricity, water supply, access roads, motor 
parks, and residential accommodation. Thus, the Native Authority maintains the local administration, 
treasuries, native courts, police and prisons, agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry and conduct 
some capital works. Giving the dominance of the traditional institutions in the administration of the 
Native Authority, there were persisted agitations for reforms with a view to altering the basis of 
political participation in order to give room for wider participation. Modern Local Governments, 
therefore, according to Odoh (1991) appeared on the Nigerian scene with the advent of the 
Macpherson Constitution that provided for a quasi-federal system of government.  
 
The composition of the Country then, that is consisting of Regional Governments; made local 
governments part of regional affairs with each region designing its own administrative structure. Thus, 
until the 1976 Local Government reforms, there was no uniform system of local government in the 
country. Therefore, subsequent changes in the structure and operations of the LGs were carried out by 
the respective regions in tandem with their social, economic, and traditional features. In the views of 
Adeyemi (2019), the Eastern Region was the first in 1950 to initiate a radical change in the operation 
and administration of Local Government with the promulgation of the Eastern Regional Local 
Government Ordinance. A three-tiered representative local government system was introduced. The 
Western Region also tried to enhance popular participation with elected councillors constituting a 
majority in the Councils. Consequently, the term NA was replaced with Local Government 
administration, and colonial officers were stripped off their functions of inspection, supervision, and 
control to a mere advisory. Whereas, in the North, far-reaching administrative reforms were made but 
left the structures unaffected. The retention of the structure though with slight adjustments to allow 
popular participation was aimed at maintaining the socio-political stability of the region giving the 
success of the indirect rule system owing to the strong entrenchment of the traditional institutions in 
the region. Thus, Odoh (1991) documented the hesitation in the North to embrace outright popular 
participation and therefore had to choose cautions and ‘gradualist’ approach to reforms. 
 
The term Native Authority was abolished and replaced variously by local government authority, local 
administration, or local administrative areas. Thus, new, and more representative bodies were 
instituted consisting of two-third elected and one-third nominated members in the North Central State. 
However, due to the ban on political activities, all the members who would otherwise have been 
elected, were nominated by the Military Governor on the recommendations of the provincial 
administration. Similarly, the functions of maintaining law and order were altered especially with the 
taking over of Area Courts by the States and the Prisons by the Federal Military Government. 
Therefore, in line with the radical changes in the structure and organization, LGs functions and scope 
were broadened in order for them to become development oriented. Hence, the LGs were saddled with 
the responsibilities of ensuring the economic and social development of their areas of jurisdiction. 
 
With regards to local government finances, it is important to highlight the long history of local 
finances and taxation since 1900. There were Native Treasuries established in 1911 with standardised 
treasury accounting procedures that were controlled through rules known as Financial Memoranda, 
which was formerly issued by the Regional Ministry for Local Government, and now under the 
direction of the State Governments. Control of treasuries is exercised by the local government division 
of the Military Governor’s office, or the Ministry for Local Government established in each State. All 
Local Authority estimates require the approval of the State Government, and the inspection of 
Treasury Accounts is conducted both by the cadre of local government officers and the state audit 
departments. The most important revenues for the Native Authority are the Community Tax levied on 
every adult male resident of the community, the cattle tax paid on specific livestock in the Native 
Authority, and the Personal Income Tax. In addition to this, Native Authorities do also receive Grants 
in Aid from the Regional Governments. 
 
In 1976, local government reform was considered an integral part of the Political Programme of the 
Federal Military Government. Thus, the reforms were considered necessary in the process of building 





a sound foundation for the return to civil rule slated in 1979. This informed the decision by the Federal 
Government to intervene in what was hitherto an exclusive reserve of the State Governments. Hence, 
the Federal Government embarks on the 1976 Local Government reform but through extensive 
consultation with the SGs. However, Olowu (1986) lamented, a fair success recorded in the first few 
years of the reform just before the return to civil rule in 1979. According to Odoh (1991), local 
governments suffered the most severe damage during this period. The State Governments owing to the 
provisions of Section 7 freely encroached and undermined LGs in all facets. This is further aggravated 
by the outright disregard of the 1979 Constitution such that no election was held at the LGs throughout 
the Second Republic (1979-1984). In addition, the State Governments went on creating additional LGs 
without regards to the reform guidelines on the creation of new LGs. 
 
The highlighted challenges coincided with the collapse of the Second Republic and the new Military 
Government of 1984 inaugurated a Committee under the Chairmanship of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki to 
review the local government system in Nigeria. The Committee affirmed and endorsed most of the 
provisions of the 1976 reforms with few modifications. The reform suggested a ten-year interval for 
the creation of additional LGs taking into consideration factors such as minimum taxable population 
and financial viability. Far-reaching recommendations of the reform were on the need for both the 
Federal, States, and LGs to share the burden of funding primary education as against the prior practice 
of letting the burden on the LGs. In affirming the recommendations of the reform, the FG embarked on 
the direct allocation of statutory allocations from the Federation Account (FA) to the LGs. Also, the 
hitherto spending limits imposed by the SGs on LGs were lifted. There was also an upward review of 
statutory allocation from the FA to the LGs from 10% in 1990 to 15% and later 20% in 1992. This was 
also followed by 35% of Value Added Tax (consumption tax on goods and services) revenues.  
 
The Military once again supervised another transition to civil rule in 1999, with a constitution that is 
virtually a replica of the 1979 Constitution. The 1999 Constitution retains all the provisions of the 
1979 Constitution pertaining to the local government system. It recognises the LGs as the third tier of 
government, controlled by the State Governments; and grants them statutory allocation from the FA 
and a certain percentage of the revenues of the States. The erstwhile controversial joint account was 
also retained. Similarly, the first and fourth schedules of the Constitution contained the names and the 
functions of the LGs. In addition, a State Independent Electoral Commission was established by the 
Constitution and was saddled with the responsibility of conducting LG elections. However, going by 
events across the country since the return to civil rule in 1999, it is inevitable to ponder and ask what 
should be done to ensure a viable local government system that is capable of harnessing local 




Functional Responsibilities of LGs in Nigeria 
 
Discourse on revenue allocation inevitably must examine the functional responsibilities of levels of 
government. Accordingly, Watts (1996) argued that the specific form and allocation of the distribution 
of powers has varied relating to the underlying degrees and kinds of common interests and diversity 
within the society in question. Therefore, each level of government in a federation is assigned 
responsibilities in consideration of the basic principle of shared rule and self-rule. In view of this, 
Nasir (2012) observed that the 1999 Constitution provides an exclusive list of central powers, a 
concurrent list of shared powers, with all residual powers going to the States and a fourth list of LG 
functions. Despite, section 7 (1) mandates States to ensure the existence of LGs under a law which 
provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, and functions; the Fourth Schedule 
further listed the main functions of the LGs. Therefore, whilst the States are required to specify the 
functions of their LGs in their various laws, it expected such specified functions to take cognizance of 
the ones stated in the Fourth Schedule. Thus, the main functions of a LG as specified in the 1999 
Constitution are as follows: 
 
i. Consideration and the making of recommendations to a state commission on economic 
planning or any similar body on (i) the economic development of the State, particularly in so 





far as the areas of authority of the LG and of the State are affected, and (ii) proposals made 
by the said commission or body. 
ii. Collection of rates, radio, and television licences. 
iii. Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds, and homes for the destitute or 
infirm. 
iv. Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, 
wheelbarrows, and carts. 
v. Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs, markets, 
motor parks and public conveniences. 
vi.   Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains and other public 
facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of a State. 
vii. Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses. 
viii. Provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal. 
ix.   Registration of all births, deaths, and marriages. 
x.  Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as 
may be prescribed by the House of Assembly; and 
xi. Control and regulation of: (i) outdoor advertising and hoarding, (ii) movement and keeping 
of pets of all description, (iii) shops and kiosks, (iv) restaurants, bakeries, and other places 
for sale of food to the public, (v) laundries, and (vi) licensing, regulation, and control of the 
sale of liquor (CFRN, 1999). 
 
In addition to these functions, LGs shall participate in the Government of a State as respects the 
following matters: 
 
i. The provision and maintenance of primary, adult, and vocational education. 
ii. The development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of mineral 
resources. 
iii. The provision and maintenance of health service; and  
iv. Such other functions as may be conferred on a LG by the House of Assembly of the State. 
 
To this end, LGs legislature have powers to make byelaws for the realisation of all the functions. 
However, matters on the concurrent between the States and the LGs can only be legislated upon when 
granted such powers by the House of Assembly of the State. The extent to which the LGs discharged 
these functions have been greatly questioned by many stakeholders ranging from policy makers, 
academicians, civil societies, and development partners. However, it has also been expressed in 
several quarters that there is the need to devolve some responsibilities to the LGs and this is very 
necessary and particularly important too.  
 
 
State-Local Governments Relations: Symbiosis or Predacity  
 
Jurisprudentially, State Governments are required to ensure a system of LG by democratically elected 
Local Government Councils, and accordingly, the Government of every State shall ensure their 
existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, and 
functions. Further to this, the LGs are mandated to participate in the economic planning and 
development in the State. Thus, they shall participate in the Government of the State as respects to the 
provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education, the development of agriculture 
and natural resources, provision and maintenance of health services, and such other functions as may 
be conferred by the House of Assembly. Thus, to a significant degree, responsibilities of SGs and LGs 
are overlapping towards providing services, and to virtually single group of beneficiaries. 
 
While this is the case, what is tenable now in all the SGs, local governments in Nigeria are under the 
supervisory control of the State Governments. According to Gboyega (1981), LGs are, as defined in 
the Constitution part of the public service of a State to be established by a Law of a House of 
Assembly. Similarly, Ebeku (1992) cited Nwabueze a famous Constitutional expert arguing that LGs 
are not independent third tier of government, but only an agency or creation of the SGs. However, 





going by the antecedents of the SGs in the exercise of this supervisory control, it is described as near 
omnipotent, and going by the laws passed by the Houses of Assembly, it can be said to have hindered 
the smooth operations of LGs. The SGs not only captured but capitalise on certain laws that had given 
them certain powers to stunt the growth of LG institutions in Nigeria. Also, the laws made by the 
Houses of Assembly with respect to the LGs, curtailed projects execution by the LGs. Similar 
observation was made by Adetiba (2017) that LGs in Nigeria would not be able to exercise their 
Constitutional functions until the Houses of Assembly passed a law. Again, Vambe (2018) opined that 
LGs had continued to suffer as SGs often abuse their supervisory powers. 
 
Another essential point is the fiscal constraints local governments are facing in Nigeria. This, 
constraint is associated to inability to administer own taxes, and overdependence on fiscal transfers 
from the Federation Account. First, the SGs have substantial influence in deciding the tax rates to be 
collected by the LGs. Secondly, the location and economic activities in most of the LGs will not 
warrant the LGs to raise any substantial revenue. This problem added to other related issues such as 
traditional values and religion does not support optimal revenue collection. Therefore, except for local 
market activities many rural LGs do not have a tax base. Thus, going by the typical idea of taxation 
system, the philosophy of taxation that is guided on economy, equity, certainty and convenience, most 
LGs in Nigeria (both urban and rural) are found to have similar treasury systems in terms of revenue 
administration. Therefore, having similar system of revenue administration across board is not only 
elusive, futile but also uneconomical as described by Adam Smith’s ‘maxims’ of taxation. Smith 
(1776: 1044) held that ‘every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the 
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the 
State’.  
 
Until 2002, LGs in Nigeria received their statutory allocation from the FAAC directly through the 
Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF) following a Supreme Court judgement 
(see AG Ogun V AG Federation 2002, 10, NWLR 232), their allocations started going through their 
respective SGs. Thus, it has been established that the SJLGA into which statutory allocation due to 
LGs, is the responsibility and the function of the government of the States to maintain as enshrined by 
section 162 (6) of the 1999 Constitution. The section provides that each State shall maintain a special 
account to be called ‘State Joint Local Government Account’ (SJLGA) into which shall be paid all 
allocations to the LGs of the State from the FA and from the Government of the State.  
 
The SJLGA therefore, is a special account established and maintained by the SGs for the purpose of 
receiving statutory allocation due to their LGs from the FA and the 10% contribution from the States’ 
IGR. However, controversies trailed whether the SGs are trustees of the SJLGA or channels for 
passing funds allocated to their respective LGs? It was held by many that the SG is merely a channel 
for passing the funds allocated to LGs for onward distribution to the respective LGs in the State. In 
other words, the SJLGA is made for convenience to transmit LG allocations. It is a collection account 
for the purpose of distributing the statutory allocations to the LGs. Also, the system is not design for 
the SGs to only receive and decide what to give to their respective LGs, but it must follow the relevant 
laws especially the Revenue Allocation Act and the Laws passed by the State House of Assembly. It is 
also reasoned that the SJLGA is meant for the States to also contribute 10% of their IGR to their 
respective LGs. 
 
On the contrary, it was argued that the account is meant to streamline the economies within states. 
This, it was opined, several LGs for instance will find it difficult to meet their salary obligations if not 
for the joint account. Thus, the essence of the account, it was argued is to ensure no LG is left behind 
in terms of meeting its obligations especially pertaining payment of salaries. Further to this, it was 
presented that there are joint projects finance by both the State and its respective LGs to finance 
projects beyond the capacity of the LGs. Thus, the essence is to have a balancing act such that those 
LGs that are buoyant enough can take care of those that are not well provided for.  
 
Regardless of the proprietary right over the SJLGA, by virtue of section 7 (6) (b) and section 162 (6), 
(8), the account is within the exclusive purview of the SGs to establish and maintain. However, 
considerable concern is shown in the way the States managed the account. The Former Speaker House 





of Representative Yakubu Dogara described the SJLGA as ‘one of the biggest evils’ (Ogundipe, 
2016). Also, the Technical Committee on the Review of the Structure of LGs in Nigeria in 2003 
observed the SJLGA had caused so much dissatisfaction between SGs and LGs thereby affecting 
programme implementation. The Committee further expressed the magnitude of the problem giving 
the disparity between the LGs’ share of the FA and what really went to the LGs. It concluded that the 
operation of the SJLGA by the SGs tended to be to the disadvantage of the LGs (FGN, 2003). 
Likewise, Wilson (2013) raised concerns over the abuse of LGs funds by the SGs through the SJLGA. 
Also, Doho et al (2018) opined that the SGs do deny LGs the funds that are due to them. Similar views 
were expressed by Festus, et al (2017) that the SGs are crippling LGs financially by inexplicable 
deductions or unduly delaying the release of funds from the SJLGA. 
 
The foregoing suggests that there are flagrant abuses of the SJLGA by the SGs such that LGs do not 
get their funds and even when they do, it is like a case of I give you your money and you come back 
and give it to me in another way. These abuses, to an extent are attributed to lack of sincerity of 
purpose and transparency in dealing with LG funds by the SGs such that, the SGs do not distinguish 
their funds with those belonging to their LGs. Consequently, the SGs are truly benefiting from the 
SJLGA thereby withholding, tempering with the allocation, determining, and making undue 
deductions. Thus, even though, there are enough justifications for the continuous existence of the 
SJLGA, yet evidence have revealed that the inordinate deductions made by the SGs and indeed, the 
management of the SJLGA had resulted in variations in the revenue allocation framework with the 
statutory distribution of revenue to the LGs. 
 
Next, is the challenge of corruption which had significantly hindered revenue collection and utilization 
in Nigeria. The little revenue collected by revenue collectors rarely end up into the LGs’ accounts. 
Related to this also is the problem of tax evasion. It is disturbing for instance in Kano State with an 
estimated population of 13,076,892 people but raising revenues of less than N300 per capita in a year. 
According to Gboyega (2011), LGs taxable resources compared to other levels of government, are 
with the least yield potential, quite expensive to collect and easy to evade. Thus, even where the base 
is there, the capacity to raise the taxes and remit same into the accounts constitute a great challenge to 
most LGs in Nigeria. Therefore, often the actual collections are far below the potential collection. In 
addition to the challenges of corruption, tax evasion and capacity of the revenue personnel, religious 
and cultural practices, nature of economic activities, location of the LGs and often political influence 
have seriously paralysed revenue collection by LGs. 
 
Giving these challenges, the SGs are making efforts to enhance internal revenue generation efforts of 
their respective LGs. The concerns are on how to reconcile tax base with tax rates. Because having a 
single tax rate had resulted in what Bird and Smart (2002) conceived as ‘undesirable incentive effects’ 
where LGs with least tax base may not generate what LGs with average tax base are likely to generate. 
In most States, the term taxes are substituted with rates and levies for local governments. This is with a 
view to harmonised rates and levies charged by the LGs in the States based on certain peculiarities, 
specifically geography and economic activities. Thus, the LGs in the State were categorised in to 
three: Urban; Semi Urban and Rural. Then, all levies and rates to be charged by a local government is 





Whilst the importance and autonomy of local governments has varied enormously from federation to 
federation, it has been the tradition of most federations to assign the determination and the scope of 
power of local governments to the intermediate state governments (see Watts, 1996). In Nigeria, 
despite local governments are creation of the National Constitution, yet their establishment, structure, 
composition, finance, and functions are the responsibility of their respective State Governments 
through laws passed by the Houses of Assembly of a State. Therefore, the success of local 
governments in Nigeria depends in large measure upon their respective SGs. Thus, in examining the 
state-local governments relations in Nigeria it has been shown that local governments have failed and 
are continuously failing. For that reason, local governments failed because the SGs have not been 





performing the responsibilities assigned to them by the Constitution. This is in line with the 
submissions of Bahl and Linn (1994) who argued that LGs in developing countries are bedevilled by 
series of controls by the higher levels of government. As such, in Nigeria, local governments are 
excessively controlled by the SGs through budget approvals, appointment of officials, regulation of tax 
administration etc. Also, there is the challenge of fiscal dependency syndrome in which LGs are 
entirely dependent on tax rates been fixed by the SGs; every expenditure is authorised by the SGs; and 
overdependent on fiscal transfers. In sum, the SGs are benefiting from the existing legal and 
operational fiscal arrangement by rendering LGs in a state of helplessness, not capable of rendering 
any services without resorting to the SGs.    
 
The ongoing agitations for restructuring and granting local governments autonomy are not 
unconnected with the failure of the SGs to monitor their respective local governments effectively and 
efficiently. Therefore, in order for local governments to function as envisaged in a decentralised 
federal system, it becomes essential to restructure how best SGs should relate with their respective 
local governments. However, it must be emphasised the ongoing agitations for granting local 
governments autonomy is misconstrued. Therefore, any attempt to restructure state-local relations 
must take cognisance of the intendment of section 7 of the 1999 Constitution, which is to instil 
cooperation and coordination between the SGs and local governments. Thus, while some legal aspects 
too require amendments, most fundamentally, it is the operational aspect of the state-local relations 
that is requiring restructuring.  
 
Notwithstanding the concerns of Jorge and Smoke (2011) that the road to instituting efficient and 
effective local government system has been far from smooth or easy, and many challenges persist to 
various degrees; this paper offers the following modest recommendations: The efforts by the Federal 
Government to ensure Houses of Assembly of State and the States judiciary enjoy relative autonomy 
as been enjoyed by the similar institutions at the federal level should be pursued and accomplished. 
This, way the institutions will checkmate the excesses of the SGs and ensure conformity with enabling 
laws. Secondly, the National Assembly should proceed with caution, the Constitutional amendment, 
because it still baffles many as to why the advocates of granting local governments autonomy are often 
the former Governors in the presently in the Senate. This is because the functions of the SGs and local 
governments are interwoven and complementary. As such it is inevitable when discharging their 
assigned responsibilities to cooperate concurrently in areas such as primary health care, basic 
education, roads, agriculture, and other too numerous socioeconomic and political goals. Moreover, 
based on the ideas of Boadway and Shah (2009), local governments are extensions of state 
governments, … depending on their constitutional and legal status, state governments in federal 
countries assume varying degrees of oversight of the provision of local public services. Third, local 
governments tenure must be defined and stated in the constitution so as to checkmate the frequent 
distortion and disruption of governance caused by the SGs who often substitute elected councils with 
their personal appointees without regards to due process.  
 
Lastly, it is apt to reiterate here that local governments are multipurpose government in Nigeria 
because they bear the burden of people much more than the SGs and the FG. This is obviously due to 
their closeness with the people that look up to them for empowerment programmes, primary health 
centers are stocked and staffed, education, basic social services (water, sanitation, agriculture, and 
forestry), and other capital projects especially street lightening, roads, planning and public 
conveniences. However, providing these basic services have been challenged by lack of 
correspondence between available revenue and expenditure responsibilities. Therefore, the practice in 
which the SGs dictate and determine every undertaken by their respective local governments is only 
aggravating the challenge of poverty of leadership bedevilling the country. Thus, it is imperative to 
restructure state-local relations such that SGs will be mandated to a great deal offer financial and 
technical support and to monitor the ways in which both human and material resources are used by the 
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